The grand failures of CICIG

Nicholas Virzi

Guatemala suffers from an international narrative painting the country as a democratic backslider. This concerted effort, led by Democrats in Congress and the State Department (DOS), has intensified ever since the Guatemalan government refused in 2019 to renew the accord that created the UN anti-corruption body known as CICIG.

This hostile treatment of Guatemala is ill-conceived and counterproductive. If blame is to be placed for the expulsion of CICIG from Guatemala, the DOS and ex-functionaries and acolytes of CICIG need only look in the mirror.

Several unforced errors marked the end of CICIG. In 2015, CICIG had achieved the apex of its popular acceptance in Guatemala. Its great achievement was the downfall of the Otto Pérez administration. This unified the country, as even Pérez´s conservative base abandoned him. It had become clear to all that Pérez had from the outset put together a complete team of corrupt actors to sack the State.

A prominent player in Pérez´s network of public functionaries was his attorney general, Thelma Aldana. She had been previously labelled as not suitable for the Supreme Court of Justice by CICIG in 2009. Once Aldana became the willing instrument of the DOS in Guatemalan domestic affairs, she magically became a paragon of independence and public virtue. Nobody ever really believed that line, but acolytes have been insistent in that risible narrative.

CICIG rapidly squandered its public trust among many Guatemalans. Popular support had given CICIG power, which went to the heads of those running the show, namely Iván Velásquez, its commissioner. Having downed one president, Velásquez seemed intent on bringing down Pérez´s successor, Jimmy Morales, on flimsy grounds. The presidential residence was raided, inflated charges were brought against his son, and CICIG took the president on frontally regarding the controversial issue of constitutional reforms recognizing indigenous law in Guatemala. These were critical errors of judgment.

Velásquez should have known that as he shifted away from the CICIG mandate, his opposition would grow. The shift away from its original mandate had been a focal point of criticism of CICIG in the early days of CICIG. Criticisms of political abuse had been made public on Twitter by a well-regarded analyst who later would become a champion of CICIG. Surely, he had his ear. The criticism was that CICIG´s politization of justice had been facilitated by the lack of controls that effectively made CICIG above the law. These abuses had effectively erased any positive legacy CICIG might have had. With CICIG, international interference in Guatemalan domestic affairs had been institutionalized. (here, here, here, here, and here).

CICIG abuses grew under Velásquez, splitting the base of popular acceptance CICIG once had. Though it energized his increasingly leftwing, partisan base, it also alienated key political and economic players.  In 2018, CICIG brought forth a case of illegal campaign financing against prominent businessmen. The issue was the donation of funds to pay for electoral observers. CICIG accused Morales´ party of failing to report these and other funds.

The businessmen admitted their unwitting mistake. This mea culpa case would hardly have raised an eyebrow in the US, where campaign finance infractions receive lenient treatment. (here, here, and here) This is important insofar as the US government was the true source of CICIG´s influence in Guatemala.

The blowback did not take long. Lobbying efforts were launched by public and private actors in Guatemala. The aim was to convince American congressional representatives to take a closer look at events in Guatemala. CICIG acolytes had been wont to trumpet its bipartisan support in Congress, which it certainly had, at one point.

At the outset, the lobbying efforts were ridiculed by the most vaunted pro-CICIG analysts. However, their fear was palpable. Until then, the Democrats in Congress, the media and DOS had controlled the narrative on CICIG. The acolytes were jealous of losing that monopoly power over the political discourse regarding Guatemala. They declared that their aim was a Guatemalan justice system that was autonomous and independent of external influence, except, apparently, that of the DOS. This they would admit in private, but never in public.

Finding some support in the US Congress, president Morales moved against CICIG. Morales publicly stated that he would not renew the CICIG mandate that was due to expire the following year, in 2019. The die was cast.

CICIG and State Department acolytes attempted a mass movement behind the Twitter slogans “CICIG Stays”, “Iván Stays”. But the crowds had dwindled to a fraction of what they had been in 2015. Outside of Twitter, and the mutual admiration society that DOS had built around itself (acolytes, NGOs in service of the US government and the permanent progressive lobby) nobody seemed to care.

A distasteful cult of personality had been cultivated around Iván Velásquez. Velásquez was his own biggest fan. The man at the front of the international effort to fortify institutions in Guatemala, came to regard himself as indispensable. It is a maxim of development studies that developing countries need strong institutions, not strong men.

Iván Velásquez would have none of that. CICIG could continue only with himself at the helm, or not continue at all. The acolytes agreed. In the end, CICIG left. If Velásquez had recognized the error of his ways and accepted that his leaving would have removed the powerful argument against CICIG, it is probable that CICIG would have remained in Guatemala.

There´s a lesson there.